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IN THE SUPREME COURT
·of the

STATE OF UTAH
JAMES J. MILLIGAN,
Plat"vrdiff and Appellant,

-vs-

CAPITOL FURNITURE COMPANY, a
Utah corporation, GLADYS PETERSON, 1\fARY E. SHULSEN and JAMES
H. SPRUNT,

Case No.

8777

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT
The parties will be designated as 1n plaintiff's
brief. vVhere the word defendants is used it means the
individual defendants who are defending this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As plaintiff has failed to set forth any of the facts
surrounding his fall, we deem it necessary to do so.
The testimony is uncontradicted that the plaintiff
fell on a sidewalk in front of defendants' building located
on West Second South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, and
that the sidewalk was 20.9 feet wide extending from the
defendants' building to the curb line on Second South
Street (Ex. D-15).
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The weather reports covering the months of January
and February, 1956, Exhibit D-16 and Exhibit D-17 disclose thai there was no snow from January 27th until
February 7th; that the average temperature was below
freezing and the maximum temperature was below freezing from January 31st through February 7th.
Plaintiff is employed by the Railroad (R. 32) and
on numerous occasions prior to his fall had stopped at
the Salt Lake Restaurant for a bite to eat prior to going
to work. He testified that he left his home about 4 :00
o'clock P.M. on the day of the accident with his friend
and neighbor, Lewis Johnston (R 33). J\1r. Johnston
drove plaintiff to the Salt Lake Restaurant, which is
located about 539-563 West Second South, the entrance
of which is .approximately 27 feet from the place where
plaintiff fell (R 33).

:~?=--:.
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Located in front of defendants' building was a
sidewalk elevator properly covered by two steel doors,
said doors covering an area of approximately 4-6 feet
square. Attached to the building directly west of the
steel doors was .a drain spout, which carried water from
the roof of the building down into a hole in the sidewalk
and ultimately out into the street (Ex. D-14).
There is conflict in the testiJ.nony as to the condition
of the sidewalk extending from the cafe east up to and
past the Beer Barrel, which was some distance east of
where plaintiff fell .and as to what plaintiff did prior to
the time he fell.
Plaintiff testified in his deposition taken in October,
1956 that when he arrived at the restaurant there was
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a little snow on the sidewalk in front of the restaurant.
He had a cup of coffee and had started east for the
railroad station when he fell. His friend was not going
to take him to the station (R. 88).
On direct examination he testified he had a sandwich and coffee and in .about 15-20 minutes left the cafe
and started east. There was snow and ice on the sidewalk,
but it was pretty clear in front of the restaurant. In
response to a leading question he testified that the sidewalk in front of the restaurant was clear (R. 33-35).
He further testified that there was ice near the big
steel doors and he started to walk around where it
looked good and clean. He was of the impression that
ice and a skiff of snow extended over the entire sidewalk
(R. 35-36).
On cross-examination he testified that he was
familiar with the premises where he fell as he went there
nearly every week (R. 82). At the restaurant he ordered
some sausage and coffee and while the sausage was
being cooked he went 'Out to look for a Mr. Hardman
(R. 82). He definitely stated that his friend was not
going to drive him to the station (R. 83). Further in
his cross-examination he testified that he went to look
for Mr. Hardman. He went west to Shulsen's Restaurant,
returned and had a cup of coffee .and that there was
snow and ice over the whole sidewalk.
Mr. Johnston, plaintiff's witness, definitely stated
that he was going to take plaintiff to the train. In
describing the activities of the plaintiff he stated that
he .and plaintiff had stopped at the restaurant, ordered
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food and that plaintiff immediately left and within a few
minutes thereafter he was advised that plaintiff had
fallen (R. 99). In describing the condition of the sidewalk
east of Yvhere plaintiff fell he testified it was clear,
except for a strip about five tJo eight feet in width
which extended across the sidewalk (R. 105).
Alex Geros, who had operated the cafe for years
and knew the plaintiff, testified that the entire sidewalk
was clear, except for about three to six feet around the
drain pipe (R. 117) and that plaintiff told him just
before he fell that he was going to the Beer Barrel
when he left the cafe (R. 118).
POINT TO BE RELIED UPON
POINT 1.
THE COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN ENTERING A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
THE COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN ENTERING A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS.

Plaintiff's Points 1, 2, 3 and -1 will be discussed
under defendants' one P1oint.
The third point argued by plaintiff is that plaintiff
w.as not contributorily negligent as a matter of law. This
question is not involved in this case. The jury by its
answer to Interrogatory No. 5, which was:
.. INTERROGATORY NO. 5. Was plaintiff
negligent in walking across the ice where he fell.
"'ANSWER. Yes."
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5
found that as a matter of fact plaintiff was negligent
and this finding by the jury is supported by the evidence.
The plaintiff under the s.ame point discusses the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's answer
to Interrogatory No. 5, claiming the same to be insufficient. The conflict in the plaintiff's own testimony and
the facts supporting the inference that plaintiff was in
a hurry, together with testimony that he was familiar
with the condition ·Of the sidewalk; that the sidewalk
was 20.9 feet in width and only a small portion of the
same was covered with ice are sufficient to support the
jury's finding that plaintiff did not exercise due care
and caution and was negligent in walking across the
ice where he fell.
In plaintiff's second point he contends that if the
answers to the special verdict questions are inconsistent
a new trial should have been granted, and in connection
with this argument, quotes the last sentence of Rule 49
(b). Rule 49 (b) does not involve the question of special
verdict and interrogatories, but involves the question of
general verdict accompanied by answer to interrog.atories.
In this case there was no general verdict rendered. The
Court submitted the cause under subdivision (a) Rule
49, which deals with special verdicts and interrogatories.
This procedure is upheld and supported by the case of
Cooper v. Evans, 1 Utah 2d 68, 262 P. 2d 270, wherein
the Court st.ated:
"There is no question but that it is within
the descretion of the trial court to follow such
procedure if he so desires. According to the answers given, the jury found the defendant guilty
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of negligence, but also found the plaintiff was
~ontributorily negligent, upon the basis of which
the trial court entered a judgment for the defendants."
The dissertation by Moore and other expounders of
the jury system, in our opinion, have no place in this
case, for regardless of ·our respective views in connection
therewith, under our present system we are governed
and controlled by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
in this case as indicated by Rule 49. This brings us to
the final question, was the Court justified in entering
.a judgment in favor of the defendants"'_,
view of the
answer to Interrogatory N·o. 6, which was:
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"INTERROGATORY NO.6. Was such negligence a proximate cause of plaintiff's f.all ~
"ANSWER. No.",?
The view stated in the case of Anderson t:. Bransford,
39 Utah 256, 116 P. 1023, we believe, is correct:

"'-

"It is true that the question of proximate
cause is ordinarily one of fact for the jury. This
is so because of different conclus~ons generally
.arising on a conflict of the evidence, or because
of different deductions or inferences arising from
undisputed facts, in respect of the question of
whether the injury was the natural and probable
consequence of the proved negligence or wrongful
act, and ought to have been foreseen in the light
of the attending circun1stances. 'Yhere, however,
there is no such conflict, and where but one deduction or inference under the eYidence is permissible, then the question of proxin1ate cause is
one of law."'

~-·
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In this case there is no question but that plaintiff's
injury was caused by slipping on the ice on the sidewalk.
The jury has found that plaintiff was negligent in
crossing the ice. With these two undisputed facts, how
could anyone arrive at a conclusion that plaintiff's negligence in crossing the ice did not contribute to his fall.
There is no evidence which shows any other intervening
c.ause. The ice upon the sidewalk and plaintiff's negligence
in crossing the same caused the fall and the injury. An
adult person who is negligent in crossing ice must reasonably anticipate that some injury might result. This is
the only deduction or inference which is permissible,
therefore it is a question of law as to the proximate
cause of plaintiff's fall.
As stated in the case of Smith V. Shevltn v. Hixon
Co. 157 F. 2d 51 (9th Cir.) the Court held that:
" 'In order to constitute a particular act the
proximate cause of the injury.' Maimi Quarry Co.
v. Seaborg Package Co., 103 Ore. 362-371, 204 P.
492-495. It is sufficient if the wrongdoer would
have reasonably anticipated that some injury
might

result~.¢

Can we say that one negligently crossing a slippery
place may not reasonably anticipate that s1ome injury
might result{
In the case of Missouri Pacific R. R. Co. v. Howard
(Ark.) 161 S.W. 2d 759, the Court stated:
"Had she stopped, before reaching the main
line track, she could have heard the train and had
she looked, after easing by the obstruction, she
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eould have seen it. It was there, making a loud
noise, whether the whistle was blown or the bell
rung, and signals cease to be a factor where the
train is plainly discoverable by other means. Thus
her own negligence was the proximate cause of her
injury, if any, which is doubtful."

_._

See also Pacific R. R. Co. v. Dawson, (Ark.) 168 SW
2d 1105.
In the case of Black v. City of Berea, (Ohio) 32 NE
1, 132 A.L.R. 1391, where plaintiff a passenger in an
automobile permitted her arm to extend outside of the
automobile and strike a rural mailbox located on the
side of a public road, the Court held:
"She was familiar with the road and the location of the mailboxes, including the one here in
question. It was broad daylight, and the evidence
shows that the mailbox was in plain sight. Under
such circumstances, a person of ordinary prudence
would not have had any part of her arm out the
window of an automobile. As a matter of law,
plaintiff was guilty of negligence which was the
proximate cause of her injury, and it was the
duty of the court to sustain defendant's motion
for a directed verdict."
The Court in the case of Tr old v. Ogden CHy, 123
Utah 270, 258 P. 2d 453 in quoting from Dean P:r;osser
stated:
"Dean Prosser points up the principle as it
applies to the instant case when he asserts that
an objective standard 1nust maintain, and that 'the
plaintiff cannot be heard to say that he did not
cmnprehend a risk which must have been obvious
to him.' Further that 'as in the case of negligence
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there are certain risks which anyone of adult age
must be taken to appreciate; the danger of slipping on ice, or falling through ungarded openings,'
etc. He goes on to say that 'In the usual case,
his knowledge and appreciation of the danger will
be a question for the jury; but where it is clear
that any person of normal intelligence in his position must have understood the danger, the issue
must be decided by the court.' "
In the case of Houston E. & W. T.R. Co. v. Lynch,
208 S.W. 714, plaintiff was assisting his wife and married
daughter in getting on the train. The train started before
he could get off.

"It is manifest (from all the evidence in the
case), or at least it is sufficient to warrant a
finding, that appellee was not caused to fall from
the train because of a sudden jirk or lurch, but
that he fell while in the attempt of alighting from
said train to the ground. But on rehearing, the
judgment was reversed. On this occasion the court
said: 'We have concluded that if the plaintiff,
Lynch, was guilty of negligence, which was left
as a question of fact to be determined by the
jury, then it follows as a matter of law that such
negligence p~oximately contributed to the injury.
It is the contention of appellee, however, that
this requested instruction takes from the jury both
the issue of negligence on the part of the plaintiff
and the issue of proximate cause; but it will be
readily seen, upon consideration of the requested
charge, that it does not take from the consideration ,of the jury, as a question of fact, the issue of
negligence on the part of the plaintiff, but it
does take from the jury the question as to whether
such negligence, if it existed, proximately contributed to the plaintiff's injury and properly so.' "
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CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the judgment should be
affirmed.

GUSTIN, RICHARDS
& MATTSSON
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents
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